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Accurate empathy, long argued to be important in psychotherapy, now is an object
of social–cognitive research. Graduate–level psychology students viewed brief
portions of a therapy session and inferred the thoughts and feelings of the client. Ac-
curacy scores were the rated similarity of their inferences to the client’s reported
thoughts and feelings. Throughout the semester course in interviewing, experimen-
tal participants practiced such judgments with feedback, while controls did not.
Both groups’ accuracy increased from pre– to post-test on inferred feelings, in part
because the post-test was easier. Nonetheless, experimental participants on the
post-test had greater accuracy of inferred feelings than controls. Women were
more accurate than men in inferences for thoughts at post-test. Implications for
training and future research are discussed.
Empathy is a factor common to most theoretical orientations in clini-
cal/counseling psychology as a means of increasing practitioners’ effec-
tiveness (Truax & Carkhuff, 1967). Empathy usually is conceptualized
as a skill that can be developed and learned if properly instructed. The
Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2005, pp. 156-171
156
The authors wish to acknowledge the statistical consultation provided by Edward
Simco, Nova Southeastern University, and Matthew Hesson–McInnis, Illinois State Uni-
versity. @FtnText = The authors would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers for
suggesting the methodological follow–up study.
Correspondence should be addressed to David F. Barone, Department of Psychology,
Campus Box 4620, Illinois State University, Normal, IL 61790; E–mail: dbaron@ilstu.edu.
construct of empathy has been discussed in psychology for over 125
years, the English term having been coined by experimental psycholo-
gist Edward Titchener (Wispe, 1987). Sigmund Freud recognized the im-
portance of empathy in establishing a strong working alliance and
conducting successful analysis (Pigman, 1995). Carl Rogers (1959) de-
fined empathy as the ability “to perceive the internal frame of reference
of another with accuracy, and with the emotional components and mean-
ings which pertain thereto” (p. 210, emphasis added). Rogers (1957,
1975) argued for empathy being “one of the most potent factors in
bringing about change and learning” (1975, p. 3).
Many psychologists have explicated empathy as a process involving
cognitive and social processes (Davis, 1983; Marks & Tolsma, 1986;
Riggio, Tucker, & Coffaro, 1989). Reik (1949; as cited in Marcia, 1987)
conceptualized empathy as having four distinct stages: identification,
incorporation, reverberation, and detachment. Later, Barrett–Lennard
(1981) proposed that there are three cyclical phases in an empathic inter-
action: inner understanding, communication or expressed understand-
ing, and received empathy. Dymond (1949) asserted that one can more
accurately understand another’s thoughts and feelings through cogni-
tive means and imaginative role-taking. She developed a scale of indi-
vidual differences in the ability to do so. Stotland (1969) argued that em-
pathy not only involves the recognition of another’s feelings on a
cognitive level, but also includes an emotional responsiveness and a
sharing of one’s feelings. Gladstein (1977) added a third aspect that
combined the cognitive and the affective.
Researchers began to develop and evaluate individual–differences
measures of empathy. The Truax Relationship Inventory (Truax &
Carkhuff, 1967) and the Barrett–Lennard Relationship Inventory
(Barret–Lennard, 1962) measure the counselor’s or the client’s judgment
of empathy in a session. Truax and Carkhuff’s (1967) Accurate Empathy
Scale and Carkhuff’s (1969) Empathic Understanding in Interpersonal
Process Scale require observers to judge empathy in counseling ses-
sions. A review of these instruments revealed that none serves to assess
all aspects of empathic ability (Feldstein & Gladstein, 1980). Other mea-
sures of empathy include the Lister Empathy Scale (Hargrove, 1974) and
the Response Empathy Rating Scale (Elliot et al., 1982). The Hogan Em-
pathy Scale (HES; Hogan, 1969) and the Questionnaire Measure of Emo-
tional Empathy (QMEE; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) are two other
widely used self–report measures of empathy. Davis (1980) developed
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), a more complex measure of four
aspects of empathy: perspective-taking, fantasy, empathic concern, and
personal distress. His results support the multidimensionality of the
empathy construct and its relation to social functioning, self–esteem,
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emotionality, and sensitivity to others (Davis, 1983). A later study of the
HES, QMEE, IRI, and empathy indices from the Social Skills Inventory
showed that empathy and social skills overlap, which suggests that
social skills may be another facet of empathy (Riggio et al., 1989).
Recent attention has been focused on teaching empathy as a learnable
skill that can aid in more accurately understanding an individual’s expe-
rience and that is essential in counseling relationships (Barak, Engle,
Katzir, & Fisher, 1987). Despite challenges concerning whether empathy
can be taught (Carkhuff & Berenson, 1967; Davis, 1980; Hatcher et al.,
1994; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), empathy training typically attempts
to teach two skills: understanding another’s thoughts and feelings and
communicating this understanding to a client (Truax & Carkhuff, 1967;
Carkhuff, 1969). Researchers have studied a variety of techniques for
teaching empathy, including verbal instruction (Shaffer & Hummel,
1979), role-playing (Guzzetta, 1976; Stone & Vance, 1976), videotape
(Dalton & Sunblad, 1976; Eisenberg & Delaney, 1970), audiotape (Perry,
1975), written and taped patient session transcripts (Finke, 1990), com-
munication skills training (Evans, Stanley, & Burrows, 1993), a
Rogerian–based curriculum in peer facilitation training (Hatcher et al.,
1994), peer mediation (Lane–Garon, 1998), and an empathy training
game that focuses on competition and enjoyment to increase trainee mo-
tivation and interest (Barak et al., 1987). The lack of agreement on the
definition of empathy and a reliable way to measure it has hindered the
adoption of conclusions from this research about how best to train
empathy (Evans et al., 1993).
Recent advances in social–personality psychology provide a promis-
ing new approach to the study of empathy. Ickes, Robertson, Tooke, and
Teng (1986) created a research paradigm to study empathic accuracy.
Dyads briefly interact; immediately afterwards and in separate rooms,
they watch a videotape of the interaction and stop it to record thoughts
and feelings they experienced during the interaction. These stop–points
and the target–supplied thoughts and feelings provide a series of items
and correct answers for a test of judgments of accurate empathy. After
observers watch the tape and infer the target’s thoughts and feelings at
the stop–points, raters score the similarity between the observers’ and
target’s responses. Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, and Garcia (1990) found
that this performance test of empathic accuracy in mixed–sex dyads did
not correlate with participants’ self–reports of empathic accuracy. This
finding may help to explain the elusiveness of the empathy construct,
which typically has been measured by self–report (Ickes, 1993, 1997). In
addition, Ickes, Stinson, et al. (1990) found no gender differences, an-
other finding later replicated in multiple studies (Hancock & Ickes, 1996;
Marangoni, Garcia, Ickes, & Teng, 1995; Riggio et al., 1989).
158 BARONE ET AL.
Ickes’ methodology has been used to study empathic accuracy for
therapy clients (Marangoni et al., 1995). Using videotapes of simulated
therapy sessions, the authors were able to show that individual differ-
ences in empathic accuracy remain consistent across targets, that em-
pathic accuracy improves with continued exposure to individual tar-
gets, and that feedback increases the rate at which it improves. That
study also revealed that some targets are less readable than others,
which suggests that tests of accurate empathy can include items that
vary in difficulty. Another study with the same stimuli showed that or-
der of presentation of the targets and of individual segments within tar-
gets had no effect (Gesn & Ickes, 1999). Furthermore, Hancock and Ickes
(1996) found that readability of the target produced differences in em-
pathic accuracy while the relationship of the perceiver to target did not.
In the current study, we used Ickes’ paradigm to evaluate a method of
teaching empathic accuracy in a graduate psychology program. We
have modified the technique to allow for group testing and training.
Taking a step beyond previous research on empathic accuracy in a clini-
cal setting (Marangoni et al., 1995), we used as the test stimulus a video-
tape of an actual therapy session conducted by a doctoral–level psychol-
ogy intern. Although the distinction between thoughts and feelings was
found to be unimportant in previous research, we included the distinc-
tion because of its potential relevance in a clinical situation. Clinicians of
several theoretical orientations draw a distinction between thought and
emotion and attempt to influence one in an effort to change the other,
such as in cognitive–behavioral therapies.
The experimental group practiced inferring thoughts and feelings
during in–class role–plays throughout the semester. In some cases, stu-
dents observed two other students role–playing therapy situations in
front of the class. At other times, students were participants in dyad
role–plays. Following the recording of thoughts and feelings, class
members received criterion information from the targets and were en-
couraged to compare their inferred responses to the actual responses
provided by each role–played “client.” In the control group, standard
role–playing of therapy situations took place; that is, without explicit re-
cording of inferences and feedback on their accuracy. Based on the find-
ing that feedback increases the rate of improvement of accuracy
(Marangoni et al., 1995), we hypothesized that, at the end of the course,
students in the experimental group would show significantly more im-
provement in empathic accuracy than those in the control group. We
also were interested in evaluating gender differences but made no
hypothesis because of conflicting findings in previous research on
empathic accuracy.
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METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
Participants in the study were 54 first–year graduate students in five in-
terviewing course sections. All were enrolled in a Ph.D. or Psy.D. pro-
gram in clinical psychology. Thirty–five were female and 18 were male
(one did not indicate gender). The mean age for the sample was 25.2
years, with a range in age from 21 to 41 years. Although 72 students
agreed to participate—31 in the experimental group and 41 in the control
group—18 students failed to complete the post-test because they left the
class session early—eight in the experimental group and 10 in the con-
trol group. Of the 54 participants who completed the study, 23 partici-
pants who were in the experimental group and 31 in the control group.
There were no gender or age differences between the two groups, nor
between those who dropped out of the two groups.
STIMULUS TAPE
A client in a community mental health center being seen by an intern for
individual therapy gave her informed consent to have one of her therapy
sessions videotaped for use in this study. After the taped session, the in-
tern therapist viewed the tape with the client and instructed her to stop
the tape in places when she could remember what she was thinking and
feeling during the session. Each time the tape was stopped, the client
wrote down these thoughts and feelings and the place on the tape
time–counter was recorded. Two 15–minute segments of the tape were
shown to participants. In the first, used as the pre-test, there were nine
places in which the client had recorded thoughts and feelings. In the sec-
ond segment, used in the post-test, the tape was stopped and thoughts
and feelings recorded in eight places.
PROCEDURE
Participants took the pre-test during the third week of a 15–week semes-
ter and the post-test in the 14th week. They signed informed consent
forms before doing the pre-test. A research assistant read instructions to
the class using the following script for the pre-test:
We are asking you to participate in a study on empathic accuracy. We
will be comparing your inferences regarding clients’ and/or students’
thoughts and feelings with the actual thoughts and feelings as recorded
by clients and/or students who have been interviewed. Please read the
consent form. If you agree to participate, we will play a segment of a
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video of a client therapy session. We will stop the tape at several places
and ask you to write on the assessment form what you think the client is
thinking and feeling at that moment in a few words or phrases, with
enough information to be complete and as specific as possible, but not
lengthy or elaborate. For example, rather than write that the client was
thinking about work, write that the client was thinking about how much
work she had to do today. Rather than write that the client was upset,
write that the client was angry–upset or sad–upset. We’ll do this now
and again at the end of the semester.
The participants, who had completed an ethics course the previous se-
mester and begun practicum activities, agreed to keep client information
anonymous and confidential. Participants were instructed to attend to
the client, not to the therapist’s interventions or therapy. Pre-test and
post-test, the participants recorded an inference of thought and an infer-
ence of feeling each time the videotape was stopped. The form that par-
ticipants were given had a space for recording a thought and a feeling for
each tape segment.
SCORING
Two research assistants, who were advanced graduate students in clini-
cal psychology and blind to participants’ condition, scored for accuracy.
They made a qualitative judgment of the accuracy of each inference writ-
ten down by participants and entered scores of 0, 1, or 2. These scores in-
dicate that, compared to the thought or feeling reported by the client, the
inference reported by the participant was judged to be essentially differ-
ent (0), somewhat similar but not the same (1), or essentially the same
content (2). To aid in reliability, qualitative decision rules were devel-
oped to guide which of the three judgments of accuracy were made (see
Appendix). The raters divided up the responses so that the score entered
into the analysis of accuracy for each participant response was that
entered by one of the raters.
In order to establish inter-rater reliability, research assistants first
rated the accuracy of the thoughts and feelings from videotapes of prac-
tice role–plays by other students not involved in the study. Because the
numerical ratings are at best ordinal, rather than a psychometric
equal–interval scale, the appropriate index of reliability is percent of
agreement: that is, the percent of rating instances that both raters made
the same judgment from the three possibilities. Note that this is a more
conservative index of inter-rater reliability than a correlation coefficient,
which gives “partial credit” for closer ratings (e.g., 1 and 2) than for more
distant ones (e.g., 0 and 2). Participant responses for this study began be-
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ing scored by one rater when inter-rater agreement for these two trained
scorers reached 90%—a very stringent criterion. Midway through scor-
ing, however, the raters checked their ratings on some common re-
sponses and found that their agreement had fallen to below 70% for
thoughts. They revised the decision rules, reestablished their agreement
at 90%, and then each went back and re–rated the responses he or she
had rated. Because the raters also were serving as the experimenters and
knew from the content of the responses whether they were pre-tests or
post-tests, other raters who were blind to this information and untrained
were brought in and briefly trained on the decision rules. Their levels of
agreement for thoughts and feelings were similar, so the results of the
trained raters were deemed unbiased.
TRAINING EXPERIENCE
Two of the five class sections of participants served as the experimental
group and the remaining three sections formed the control group for the
study. Each section was taught by a different professor but had the same
course goals and included role-playing of interviewing skills. Typically
involved was the assignment of some simulated therapy situation in
which one student interviewed another playing the role of the patient. In
addition, the experimental group practiced inferring thoughts and feel-
ings during in–class role–plays and received immediate feedback on the
accuracy of their inferences. The control group did not receive feedback.
The number of practice times inferring thoughts and feelings varied in
each class session for each participant.
RESULTS
Data were subjected to a multivariate analysis of variance for two
within–subject factors—measure (feelings/thoughts) and test
(pre/post)—and one between–subjects factor—group (experimen-
tal/control). Alpha was set at .05 and partial eta–squared was used for
effect size. F(1, 52) values were significant for measure, (309.74, η2 = .86),
test (8.62, η2 = .14), measure by test (10.91, η2 = .17), and condition, (5.28,
η2 = .09), but not for the other interactions. Given the interaction, group
results for pre-test and post-test are shown by measure in Figure 1 and
Figure 2. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Feelings were more ac-
curately inferred than thoughts (M = 1.00 vs. .41), post-test scores were
higher than pre-test scores (M = .76 vs. M = .66), and experimental scores
were higher than controls (M = .76 vs. M = .67). Pre– and post-test scores
were uncorrelated except modestly for thoughts in the control condi-
tion. Targeted comparisons related to the hypothesis of the study were
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made with t–tests (α = .05). Paired–samples two–tailed t–tests found a
significant increase in accuracy from pre-test to post-test for inferred
feelings, in the experimental group (t [22] = –2.93) and a marginal one in
the control group (t [30] = –2.10), but no increase in the accuracy of in-
ferred thoughts in either the experimental group (t [22] = –.28) or the
control group (t [30] = .48). Independent–samples two–tailed t–tests
found that, at post-test, accuracy in inferring feelings was significantly
greater for the experimental than control group (t [53] = 2.65), but there
were no differences for thoughts (t [53] = .92). Thus, there was improve-
ment in empathic accuracy, but just for feelings, in both groups. The
trained group showed more accuracy in inferring feelings than the
control group.
Secondary analyses were conducted to check for differences related to
class section, gender, and practice (α = .05). Using pre-test levels as a
covariate, a one–way analysis of covariance showed no effect of class
section at post-test on the accuracy of inferred thoughts or feelings (Fs[4,
48] = .88, 1.73). Thus, the differences found cannot be explained by the
differential effects of class structure or instructor, irrespective of the
training experience introduced. There were twice as many women par-
ticipants as men, and homogeneity of variance was lacking for
ANOVAs. Gender differences were evaluated with independent–sam-
ples two–tailed t–tests (equal variances not assumed). Prior to training
(pre-test), there were no differences in the accuracy of inferred feelings
or thoughts. Post-test, women scored higher than men (M = .45 vs. M =
.32) on accuracy of inferred thoughts (t [48.2] = –2.71), but there were no
differences on accuracy of inferred feelings. Regression analysis of the
mean accuracy ratings of experimental participants across class practice
sessions revealed a positive relationship between session and the accu-
racy of inferred feelings (F = 3.90, R2 = .023), but not for accuracy of in-
ferred thoughts (F = 1.20, R2 = .007). However, total times practiced dur-
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TABLE 1. Empathic Accuracy by Group Before and After an Interviewing Course
Thoughts Feelings
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test
Group M SD M SD r M SD M SD r
Experimental (n = 24) .42 .19 .43 .22 –.36* .93 .28 1.24 .40 .02
Control (n = 31) .41 .18 .38 .18 .20 .88 .29 1.01 .24 .16
Note. Empathic accuracy was rated 0 (different), 1 (similar), or 2 (the same). Correlations are between
pre–test and post–test. *p < .05.
ing class (M = 19.3, SD = 5.31) did not predict the accuracy of inferred
feelings or thoughts on the post-test.
FOLLOW–UP STUDY
The above study includes results on change from pre-test to post-test, in
addition to comparisons of post-test scores. Although the tests were ex-
cerpted from the same psychotherapy session to minimize differences,
the study cannot discount the possibility that changes reflect differences
in the difficulty of the two tests rather than improvements from training.
Thus, a follow–up study was conducted to check the comparability of
the two tests. A separate group of 21 students in their first year of gradu-
ate study in clinical psychology were recruited from a class in adult
psychopathology. As in the procedure described above, these partici-
pants watched the videotaped therapy session, the tape was stopped at
the appropriate times, and the participants recorded what they inferred
the client was thinking and feeling at those times. Ten of these partici-
pants watched the pre-test items first and the post-test items second,
while 11 of them watched the post-test items first and the pre-test items
second. Then, an additional measure of difficulty was obtained. The test
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FIGURE 1. Accuracy of inferred feelings before and after an interviewing course.
administrator announced what the client said she was thinking and feel-
ing at each of the stops in the tapes. As each correct answer was given,
the participants rated their own subjective difficulty in inferring that
thought and feeling on a 7–point Likert scale (1 = very easy, 4 = neither
difficult nor easy, and 7 = very difficult).
Two independent raters, unaware of the purpose of the study, were
trained in the empathic accuracy scoring system. Over five training ses-
sions, using training materials and the decision rules from the previous
study, their inter-rater reliability of accuracy judgments increased from
75% agreement on thoughts and 76% agreement on feelings (N = 85) to
85% agreement on thoughts and 88% agreement on feelings (N = 128).
Given that these raters had much less experience than those in the main
study, it was decided to accept this level of agreement and have both rat-
ers independently judge the accuracy of the participants’ inferences on
every pre-test and post-test item. The raters then met to compare their
ratings, identified any differences, and agreed upon each final accuracy
judgment.
These data were subjected to two multivariate analyses of variance,
one for empathic accuracy and one for subject difficulty. Each analysis
included two within–subject factors—test (pre/post) and measure (feel-
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FIGURE 2. Accuracy of inferred thoughts before and after an interviewing course.
ings/thoughts)—and one between–subjects factot—test order
(pre/post or post/pre). Alpha was set at .05 and partial eta–squared was
used for effect size. For empathic accuracy, F(1, 19) values were signifi-
cant for measure (97.33, η2 = .84) and time by measure (27.52, η2 = .59), but
not for test (2.76) or order (1.01) or other interactions. Consistent with the
primary study, empathic accuracy for feelings was higher than for
thoughts (M = .80 vs. M = .34). To further explore the interaction, shown
in Figure 3, paired–sample two–tailed t–tests were run. The difference
between the two tests was significant for feelings (t [20] = –3.60) and
marginal for thoughts (t [20] = 2.16). The broken line for feelings mea-
sured during a single session in Figure 3 shows a larger difference than
the dotted line for feelings in the control condition in Figure 1, suggest-
ing that the latter’s change results from an easier post-test rather than
from improvement.
For subjective difficulty, F(1, 19) values were significant for measure
(14.37, η2 = .43) and order (6.63, η2 = .26), but not for test (1.94) or any in-
teractions. Thus, despite performance differences between pre-test and
post-test, participants reported no differences in subjective difficulty.
Also, despite a lack of performance differences for order, participants
who took a test second, regardless of which one, reported it to be more
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FIGURE 3. Accuracy of inferred feelings and thoughts during a single session.
difficult than those who took it first (M = 4.72 vs. M = 3.98). The one con-
sistent finding across measures was that the participants reported
greater difficulty in judging thoughts than feelings (M = 4.61 vs. M =
4.12) and had lower accuracy scores in inferring thoughts compared to
feelings.
DISCUSSION
Using Ickes’ model, this study assessed empathic accuracy by clini-
cians–in–training for an actual client during psychotherapy. Of partici-
pants taking a semester–long course for developing interviewing skills,
some practiced making empathic judgments about a variety of targets
and received immediate feedback on accuracy from the target. In confir-
mation of the study’s hypothesis, these participants demonstrated
greater accuracy of inferring feelings, but not thoughts, than those who
did not receive such training during the course. Additional support for
the hypothesis was provided by experimental participants’ improved
accuracy in inferring various targets’ feelings, but not thoughts, during
practice sessions throughout the course. A follow–up study showed that
increases in the post-test accuracy of inferred feelings in the control
group could not be attributed to the interviewing course because there
were higher scores on the post-test taken in a single setting, whether
taken before or after the pre-test. Thus, the overall results of this study
found no increase in empathic accuracy, as measured in the Ickes’ para-
digm, as a result of a standard interviewing course, but found that
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TABLE 2. Empathic Accuracy and Subjective Difficulty Scores During a Single Session
Pre–test Post–test
Order 1 Order 2 Order 1 Order 2
Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD
Feelings
EA .81 .27 .51 .23 .94 .26 .97 .29
SDS 3.80 .94 4.63 .87 3.74 .85 4.30 1.0
Thoughts
EA .40 .22 .38 .21 .25 .12 .31 .16
SDS 4.43 .85 5.06 .80 3.95 .96 4.92 .78
Note. For Order 1, n = 10, and for Order 2, n = 11. Empathic accuracy (EA) was rated 0 (different), 1 (sim-
ilar), or 2 (the same). Subjective Difficulty Scores (SDS) were rated on a 7–point scale from easy to diffi-
cult. Order 1 was pre-test followed by post-test; Order 2 was post–test followed by pre–test.
targeted practice with feedback for this skill resulted in significantly
greater accuracy for inferring feelings.
These findings are consistent with those of Marangoni et al. (1995) and
Gesn and Ickes (1999), which were based on training college students on
non–clinical targets. Their study and other research using Ickes’ method
dropped separate measures of thoughts and feelings after failing to find
differences between them. It is possible that the greater difficulty of in-
ferring thoughts found in the present study is a consequence of having a
clinical target; such targets’ experiences and interpretations are likely to
be less normative and therefore less readable or predictable. In addition,
while emotion may be deduced from displayed affect or facial expres-
sions, thoughts must be inferred from the context of the interaction,
which may be a more difficult task. Furthermore, number of emotions is
limited (despite a large vocabulary for them) across persons, while the
range of thoughts and different levels of description are unlimited. The
decision rules for determining the similarity level of thoughts and feel-
ings used by the raters, presented in the Appendix, indicate the different
strategies used in scoring these two dimensions. It also is possible, how-
ever, that the small number of thoughts and feelings sampled differed in
difficulty. Further research is needed to test more adequately (with
many more items) the thought/feeling distinction in clinical settings. If
supported, the training of cognitive empathic accuracy, as opposed to
affective empathic accuracy, in clinical settings needs further study.
Unlike previous nonclinical studies (Ickes et al, 1990; Hancock & Ickes,
1996; Marangoni et al., 1995; Riggio et al., 1989) that found no gender dif-
ferences, this study found a gender difference in the accuracy of thought
inferences at post-test. Both males and females averaged less than “simi-
lar” in inferring thoughts, however, at least according to the decision
rules for accuracy ratings used in this study. Furthermore, there was
only one test target, who was female. Further research is needed to in-
vestigate possible gender differences in clinical empathic accuracy. This
research should include conditions in which participants know that they
are being evaluated on empathy (Ickes, Gesn, & Graham, 2000).
This study demonstrates that research on empathic accuracy in social
psychology offers a fruitful method of researching the training of em-
pathic accuracy in clinicians and counselors. This method provides a
performance assessment for the important clinical skill of empathic ac-
curacy, and this study demonstrates that emotional empathic accuracy
can be improved as part of clinical training. Undoubtedly, the process of
empathy, especially in a long–term relationship like psychotherapy, is
much more complex than this measurement of empathic accuracy. But,
like any good test, this one provides an efficient measure, and as a per-
formance test with a criterion, it is an advance over judgments of empa-
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thy by self or others. This preliminary study demonstrated, however,
that more research is needed on the development of such a test in order
to have different forms of it with equal difficulty.
It remains for future research to test whether improvement in the ther-
apeutic process of empathy is correlated with positive outcomes of psy-
chotherapy, as has long been claimed. Are there critical levels of em-
pathic accuracy associated with effective therapy? Are there entry levels
necessary to benefit from training in clinical and counseling programs?
Can training be developed to improve the accuracy of inferred thoughts
as well as of feelings? Finally, it would be of value to develop a set of test
tapes of psychotherapy clients (or, if that is not ethically permissible,
then of actors posing as clients), varying in types of disorder and diffi-
culty in readability, so that we can test the crucial aspects of social
intelligence needed by counselors and clinicians.
REFERENCES
Barak, A., Engle, C., Katzir, L., & Fisher, W. A. (1987). Increasing the level of empathic un-
derstanding by means of a game. Simulation and Games, 18, 458–470.
Barrett–Lennard, G. T. (1962). Dimensions of therapist response as causal factors in thera-
peutic change. Psychological Monographs, 76, 1–33.
Barrett–Lennard, G. T. (1981). The empathy cycle: Refinement of a nuclear concept. Journal
of Counseling Psychology, 28, 91–100.
Carkhuff, R. R. (1969). Helping and human relations (Vols. 1 & 2). New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
Carkhuff, R. R., & Berenson, G. (1967). Beyond counseling and therapy. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston.
Dalton, R. F., & Sunblad, L. M. (1976). Using principles of social learning in training for
communication of empathy. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 23, 454–457.
Davis, M. (1980). A multidimensional approach to individual differences in empathy. Cata-
log of Selected Documents in Psychology, 10, 85.
Davis, M. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidi-
mensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 113–126.
Dymond, R. F. (1949). A scale for the measurement of empathic ability. Journal of Consulting
Psychology, 13, 127–133.
Eisenberg, S., & Delaney, D. J. (1970). Using video simulation of counseling for training
counselors. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 17, 15–19.
Elliot, R., Filipovich, H., Harrigan, L., Gaynor, J., Reimschuessel, C., & Zapadka, J. K.
(1982). Measuring response empathy: The development of a multicomponent rat-
ing scale. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 29, 379–387.
Evans, B. J., Stanley, R. O., & Burrows, G. D. (1993). Measuring medical students’ empathy
skills. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 66, 121–133.
Feldstein, J., & Gladstein, G. A. (1980). A comparison of the construct validities of four mea-
sures of empathy. Measurement and Evaluation in Guidance, 13, 49–57.
Finke, J. (1990). Can psychotherapeutic competence be taught? Psychotherapy and
Psychosomatics, 53, 64–67.
EMPATHIC ACCURACY 169
Gesn, P. R., & Ickes, W. (1999). The development of meaning contexts for empathic accu-
racy: Channel and sequence effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
746–761.
Gladstein, G. A. (1977). Empathy and counseling outcome: An empirical and conceptual
review. Counseling Psychologist, 6, 70–79.
Guzzetta, R. (1976). Acquisition and transfer of empathy by the parents of early adoles-
cents through structured learning training. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 23,
449–453.
Hancock, M., & Ickes, W. (1996). Empathic accuracy: When does the perceiver–target rela-
tionship make a difference? Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 13, 179–199.
Hargrove, D. S. (1974). Verbal interaction analysis of empathic and nonempathic responses
of therapists. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 305.
Hatcher, S. L, Nadeau, M. S., Walsh, L. K., Reynolds, M., Galea, J., & Marz, K. (1994). The
teaching of empathy for high school and college students: Testing Rogerian meth-
ods with the interpersonal reactivity index. Adolescence, 29, 961–974.
Hogan, R. (1969). Development of an empathy scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psy-
chology, 33, 307–316.
Ickes, W. (1993). Empathic accuracy. Journal of Personality, 61, 587–610.
Ickes, W. (Ed.). (1997). Empathic accuracy. New York: Guilford.
Ickes, W., Gesn, P. R., & Graham, T. (2000). Gender differences in empathy accuracy: Dif-
ferential ability or differential motivation? Personal Relationships, 7, 95–109.
Ickes, W., Robertson, E., Tooke, W., & Teng, G. (1986). Naturalistic social cognition: Meth-
odology, assessment, and validation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,
66–82.
Ickes, W., Stinson, L., Bissonnette, V., & Garcia, S. (1990). Naturalistic social cognition: Em-
pathic accuracy in mixed–sex dyads. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59,
730–742.
Lane–Garon, P. S. (1998). Developmental considerations: Encouraging perspective taking
in student mediators. Mediation Quarterly, 16, 201–217.
Marangoni, C., Garcia, S., Ickes, W., & Teng, G. (1995). Empathic accuracy in a clinically rel-
evant setting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 854–869.
Marcia, J. (1987). Empathy and psychotherapy. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer (Eds.), Empathy
and its development (pp. 81–102). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Marks, T., & Tolsma, R. (1986). Empathy research: Some methodological considerations.
Psychotherapy, 23, 4–20.
Mehrabian, A., & Epstein, N. (1972). A measure of emotional empathy. Journal of Personal-
ity, 40, 525–543.
Perry, M. A. (1975). Modeling and instructions in training for counselor empathy. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 22, 173–179.
Pigman, G. (1995). Freud and the history of empathy. International Journal of Psychoanalysis,
76, 237–256.
Riggio, R. E, Tucker, J., & Coffaro, D. (1989). Social skills and empathy. Personality and Indi-
vidual Differences, 10, 93–99.
Rogers, C. R. (1957). Necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change.
Journal of Consulting Psychology, 21, 95–103.
Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality, and interpersonal relationships as
developed in the client–centered framework. In S. Koch (Ed.), Psychology: The study
of a science. Volume 3. Formulations of the person and the social context (pp. 184–256).
New York: McGraw–Hill.
Rogers, C. R. (1975). Empathic: An unappreciated way of being. The Counseling Psycholo-
gist, 2, 2–10.
170 BARONE ET AL.
Shaffer, W. F., & Hummel, T. J. (1979). Three experiments using an algorithm for empathic
responses. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 26, 279–284.
Stone, G. L., & Vance, A. (1976). Instruction, modeling, and rehearsal: Implications for
training. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 23, 272–279.
Stotland, E. (1969). Exploratory investigations of empathy. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 4). New York: Academic Press.
Truax, C. B. & Carkhuff, R. R. (1967). Towards effective counseling and psychotherapy. Chicago,
IL: Aldine.
Wispe, L. (1987). History of the concept of empathy. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer (Eds.), Em-
pathy and its development (pp. 17–37). New York: Cambridge University Press.
EMPATHIC ACCURACY 171
